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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
States Should Quickly Reform Unemployment Insurance 
by Brian Galle, David Gamage, Erin Adele Scharff, and Darien Shanske
COVID-19 is causing mass layoffs and related 
economic hardship, as well as budget crises for 
state and local governments.1 This article is part of 
Project SAFE (State Action in Fiscal Emergencies), 
an academic effort to help states weather the fiscal 
crisis by providing policy recommendations 
backed by research.2 This article will focus on how 
state governments should reform unemployment 
insurance (UI) eligibility and benefits and the 
taxes funding these programs.
Economic downturns are the wrong time to 
worry about fiscal rectitude. Yet, in the past, states 
have contributed to national economic misery 
during recessions by reducing benefits, cutting 
public sector jobs, and raising taxes.3 Prudent 
fiscal planning in the form of rainy day funds can 
help to avoid this dilemma, but no state’s rainy 
day fund is anywhere near large enough to 
weather the current storm.4 Borrowing is a painful 
alternative, but when savings are not enough, it 
must be embraced. That is especially so now, 
when we face not an ordinary recession but one in 
which the capacity of state and local governments 
to respond to the urgent physical needs of their 
citizens is in high demand. States must quickly 
seek additional funds from sources that will not 
exacerbate economic misery for state residents. 
Federal aid is especially to be sought because — in 
contrast to state governments — the federal 
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In this installment of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, the authors discuss COVID-19 and how 
state governments should act to reform 
unemployment insurance eligibility and benefits 
and the taxes funding these programs.
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Gladriel Shobe et al., “Introducing Project SAFE (State Action in 




David Gamage, “Preventing State Budget Crises: Managing the 
Fiscal Volatility Problem,” 98 Cal. L. Rev. 749, 754-68 (2010).
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Grant A. Driessen, “State and Local Fiscal Conditions and Economic 
Shocks,” Congressional Research Service (Mar. 20, 2020) (stating that 
although there was projected to be roughly $62 billion in state rainy day 
funds at the end of 2019, “use of rainy day funds alone would likely be 
insufficient to bridge state financing gaps from a moderate or severe 
recession”); Michael Leachman and Jennifer Sullivan, “Some States Much 
Better Prepared Than Others for Recession,” Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (Mar. 20, 2020); and Jared Walczak, “State Strategies for 
Closing FY 2020 With a Balanced Budget,” Tax Foundation (Apr. 2, 2020).
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government does not operate under balanced 
budget constraints. The next best source of funds 
is to seek the cheapest possible sources of credit.
UI has long been proven to be one of the 
government’s most effective fiscal tools against 
recessions.5 During the current political climate, it 
also offers states probably the cheapest source of 
effective credit, and a nearly limitless one to boot. 
Put another way, as of the time of writing, the 
amount of federal aid to the states has been 
plainly inadequate.6 The states can reform their UI 
systems so as to generate substantial additional 
federal support.
Unfortunately, to access this lifeline, states 
will have to act aggressively to set aside long-
standing resistance to truly effective UI programs 
— that is, state governments must abandon (at 
least temporarily) the many needless obstacles 
that have accumulated over time that make it 
difficult for individuals to claim UI in an 
expedient and effective fashion. These barriers 
have made it difficult not only for individuals to 
file claims, but also costly and cumbersome for 
states to process them. News stories abound 
about states struggling with backlogs of cases that 
may stretch for months at current processing 
rates. That is intolerable.
To be clear, we think that most — if not all — 
of these obstacles probably merit permanent 
demolition, but we would not make this perfect 
outcome the enemy of a good (and crucially 
needed) outcome in the form of temporary 
waivers. Thus, in this article, we will argue that 
temporary waivers of many UI obstacles would be 
an important and urgently needed contribution to 
state budgets and to the national economy. As we 
will explain, with some simple steps, states can 
expand benefits, ease barriers to filing claims, and 
wipe out long backlogs of individuals waiting for 
their claims to be processed.
It may be useful for readers to first have a brief 
overview of how the UI system works and is 
financed.7 UI provides payments to qualifying 
separated workers. States control, subject to some 
minimum federally set floors, the rules for what 
makes workers qualify to receive benefits; the 
systems for verifying that workers meet those 
qualifications; the fraction of wages that 
qualifying workers receive; and the rules 
governing how long benefits are provided.8 The 
U.S. Department of Labor is authorized to 
approve or reject state benefit changes if they are 
inconsistent with federal law, but federal law 
provides fairly wide latitude to states in these 
areas.9
State UI benefits are financed by a tax similar 
to federal payroll taxes (that is, a tax imposed on 
worker wages up to an annual limit, which varies 
by state from $7,000 to about $52,000),10 paid by 
employers.11 Taxes are “experience rated,” which 
means that employers whose employees 
successfully claim benefits are taxed at a higher 
rate.12 Obviously, this encourages employers to 
make claiming benefits hard for workers.13 The 
federal government also imposes a small tax on 
the first $7,000 of each worker’s wages, and uses 
this money mostly to pay any emergency benefits 
authorized by Congress and to establish a reserve 
fund for states to access in crisis.
Since payments during recessions are usually 
inadequate to meet demand, federal law strongly 
encourages states to establish a trust fund 
account, which serves as a kind of rainy day fund 
for UI benefits. States that deplete their own 
reserves can borrow against the federal fund, 
which in turn can borrow against general federal 
revenues. Federal law requires states to begin 
5
Walter Nicholson and Karen Needles, “Unemployment Insurance: 
Strengthening the Relationship Between Theory and Policy,” 20 J. Econ. 
Perspectives 47, 48 (2006).
6
Elizabeth McNichol et al., “States Need Significantly More Fiscal 
Relief to Slow the Emerging Deep Recession,” Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities (Apr. 14, 2020).
7
Readers can find somewhat longer summaries in Congressional 
Budget Office, “Unemployment Insurance in the Wake of the Recent 
Recession,” CBO Pub. No. 4525 (Nov. 2012), and U.S. Department of 
Labor, “Unemployment Compensation: Federal-State Partnership” (May 
2019); and a much more extensive discussion in Brian Galle, “How to 
Save Unemployment Insurance,” 50 Ariz. St. L.J. 1009 (2019).
8
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Benefits.
9
See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 3-6, 11; and 26 U.S.C. section 
3304(a).
10
U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Features of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws Effective January 2020.
11
Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania also collect some tax from 




Patricia M. Anderson and Bruce D. Meyer, “The Effects of Firm 
Specific Taxes and Government Mandates With an Application to the 
U.S. Unemployment Insurance Program,” 65 J. Pub. Econ. 119 (1997).
©
 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
































Electr nic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619584
ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
TAX NOTES STATE, MAY 4, 2020  637
repaying some of these loans relatively quickly — 
by September 30 for loans taken out before May of 
this year.14 Loans taken between May and 
September will not be due until December 2021, 
although interest will accrue in the interim.15 
Federal law imposes substantial penalties if 
balances are not eventually repaid.16 In the 
aftermath of 2008, however, Congress suspended 
interest payments for an additional two years.17 
Federal law now authorizes interest-free 
borrowing for states that hit trust fund targets,18 
and while about 60 percent of states were at that 
target in February, the interest suspension lasts 
only until October 1.19
This combination of rules creates both serious 
dangers and major opportunities for states. The 
dangers are largely dangers of stasis. The 
combination of experience rating, political 
economy, and poor program design has resulted 
in significant pressure on states to minimize 
benefits and make them difficult to claim.20 
Adding to these intentional obstacles, the 
challenge of massive spikes in public need and 
claim filings has resulted in performance that is, 
predictably, four-letter-word inspiring.21 Further, 
if states comply with their existing experience-
rating laws, they will soon begin hiking taxes to 
fill their empty trust funds, further delaying any 
economic recovery.
But the present opportunities to improve UI 
systems are great as well. More than 20 states 
began 2020 with balances in their UI trust funds 
that were too low to meet a standard measure of 
adequate savings.22 The widespread fiscal pain 
this entails suggests that there will almost 
certainly be, at minimum, a repeat of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
approach of suspending interest on state debts for 
a substantial period, and there will likely be 
considerable pressure to wipe out at least a 
portion of state debts to the federal fund. We say 
this both as a positive prediction of what we 
expect from the federal government, and as a 
normative statement of what the federal 
government should do as part of making the UI 
program function appropriately in this crisis.
States, in short, can reasonably expect to be 
able to borrow at minimal interest to fund 
essentially unlimited UI expenditures. Further, 
since the state UI trust fund is not a balance sheet 
item in most jurisdictions, this borrowing will not 
affect legal balanced-budget obligations.
We should acknowledge that this 
recommendation comes with fiscal risks. 
Admittedly, not all bond rating agencies will 
overlook state UI debts, but at current interest 
rates, the marginal cost of a slightly lower rating 
is modest compared with the budgetary and 
human payoffs. After the Great Recession, states 
scrambled to repay the federal government before 
penalty provisions kicked in, including by cutting 
benefits. Some states found that they could secure 
lower interest rates through general obligation 
bonds than by borrowing from the U.S. Treasury.23 
Our argument is that the nation has likely learned 
enough from this experience not to repeat it. Even 
if not, the choice between UI borrowing now, 
when unemployment rates are in double digits, 
and slightly higher taxes in several years seems to 
us an easy choice.
For these reasons, state governments should 
massively increase UI spending, beginning as 
soon as possible, and then devote every effort to 
qualifying as many beneficiaries as possible 
rapidly. Under the recently enacted Coronavirus 
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, 
Congress provides an additional $600 per 
qualifying worker per benefits period payment, 
all fully federally funded.24 This offers massive 
potential economic relief and potential stimulus 
to local economies, with obvious knock-on effects 
14
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 8.
15
Id.; see generally 20 CFR section 606.
16
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 8-9.
17
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, P.L. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009).
18
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, supra note 7, at 9-10.
19
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, State Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund 
Solvency Report 2020; 20 CFR 606.32.
20
See Galle, supra note 7, at 1030-36.
21
See Gary Fineout and Marc Caputo, “‘It’s a Sh-- Sandwich’: 
Republicans Rage as Florida Becomes a Nightmare for Trump,” Politico, 
Apr. 3, 2020 (quoting Florida official describing Florida’s UI 
administration as a “sh*t sandwich.”); see also Lawrence Mower, “Ron 
DeSantis Was Warned About Florida’s Broken Unemployment Website 
Last Year, Audit Shows,” Tampa Bay Times, Mar. 31, 2020.
22
U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 19.
23
U.S. Department of Labor, supra note 19.
24
CARES Act section 2104.
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for revenue sources such as state and local sales 
taxes. Yet under current law in some states, 
relatively few separated workers will receive any 
benefits. For instance, in Southern and Mountain 
states, fewer than one in five workers who lose 
their jobs typically receive UI.25
States should thus act immediately to remove 
as many obstacles to claiming benefits as possible. 
Ideally, states would ask employers to identify 
every separated worker, and automatically enroll 
those workers for UI benefits. If verification 
procedures were deemed necessary, state agency 
employees could follow up later, and separated 
workers who are ultimately deemed ineligible 
could be cut off from additional benefits. Now, 
though, the burdens of inertia and bureaucratic 
box-checking should rest entirely on the state. To 
facilitate this process, states should suspend 
experience rating,26 and perhaps even offer small 
bounties to employers that identify workers who 
successfully claim benefits.
States should also be creative in expanding 
eligibility for benefits. Federal law, for instance, 
already allows states to grant benefits for “short 
time” or “work sharing” employees, whose 
positions are not eliminated but whose hours are 
reduced.27 Nevertheless, about 20 states do not use 
this authority presently. The CARES Act 
encourages short-time programs by paying 100 
percent of the state’s 2020 benefit payments. Even 
states whose laws don’t authorize short-term 
benefits can get a 50 percent federal contribution 
by entering into a temporary agreement with the 
U.S. Department of Labor.28
Again, because federal law places no real caps 
on state benefit generosity, states have the 
flexibility to vastly expand benefits for part-time 
workers, to lengthen benefits duration, to make 
“replacement rates” (that is, the fraction of former 
wages paid by UI) much higher, and to offer 
transitional training and job search assistance. 
Although the CARES Act provides a modest 
benefit for gig and other nontraditional workers,29 
states could still take greater steps to provide a 
lifeline to these workers.
A traditional worry about many of these 
approaches, especially about long-term and 
hassle-free benefits, is that they might discourage 
workers from seeking new work. Recent social 
science shows these fears are overblown. 
Especially in recessions, when work is scarce, 
workers are reluctant to turn down any work 
opportunities.30 There is, in other words, little 
moral hazard during recessions. States could 
return to their old policies when the crisis is far in 
our rearview mirrors, but for now, there is little 
downside to dramatically increasing the ease and 
generosity of UI programs.
When the coronavirus crisis is over, the 
country will need to confront the poor program 
design choices that made UI a shadow of what it 
was made for.31 We hope to address some of these 
steps in a later article. But even now, before such 
reform, the system has enough flexibility that 
states can abandon decades of bad policy and 
transform UI into the crisis stopper it was 
designed to be. States should take advantage of 
this flexibility promptly to prevent unnecessary 
harm. 
25
U.S. Department of Labor, Chartbook, Recipiency Rates by State 
2019.
26
At least 16 states have already done this. National Employment 
Law Project, “Policy Brief: Unemployment Insurance Protections in 
Response to COVID-19: State Developments” (Mar. 27, 2020).
27
26 U.S.C. section 3306(v).
28
CARES Act sections 2108, 2109.
29
CARES Act section 2102.
30
Kory Kroft and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, “Should Unemployment 
Insurance Vary With the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence,” 
83 Rev. Econ. Stud. 1092, 1093 (2016); Jesse Rothstein, “Unemployment 
Insurance and Job Search in the Great Recession,” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, at 143, 181 (Fall 2011); Johannes F. Schmieder et al., 
“The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business 
Cycle: Evidence From Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20 
Years,” 127 Q.J. Econ. 701, 703, 746 (2012).
31
See Galle, supra note 7, at 1049-63 for proposals.
©
 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
































Electr nic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3619584
